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Abstract 
There is a current controversy concerning the appropriate size of banks’ capital requirements, 
and the trade-off between the costs and benefits of implementing higher capital requirements. 
We quantify the size of capital buffers required to reduce system-wide losses using confidential 
regulatory data for Australian banks from 2002 to 2014 and annual public accounts from 1978 
to 2014. We find that a moderate increase in bank capital buffers is sufficient to maintain 
financial system resilience, even after taking economic downturns into consideration. 
Furthermore, while banks benefit from paying a lower cost of debt when they have a higher 
capital buffer, lending volumes are lower indicating that credit supply may be hampered if bank 
capital levels are too high within a financial system.   
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1. Introduction  
There is a current debate concerning the appropriate size of capital requirements for 
banks to mitigate system-wide losses, and the economic trade-off associated with raising more 
capital. Admati and Hellwig (2014) propose that financial institutions should raise their capital 
levels by 12% from current levels4, arguing that banks are unconstrained in their capital 
funding. The Bank of England (2016) has proposed to increase minimum capital levels via a 
systemic importance buffer of up to 2.5%5. These numbers are in addition to the capital 
maintenance buffer and countercyclical capital buffer under Basel III. However, as equity is 
costly the trade-off between the costs and benefits of raising capital is controversial. Higher 
capital is often associated with higher funding costs6 and lower lending volumes, which in turn 
leads to lower economic activity.   
In this paper, we analyse the dynamics of loan loss rates and the interactions of such 
dynamics on banks’ capital buffers and system resilience using a sample of Australian banks. 
In addition, we also examine the implications of raising capital for banks’ funding costs and 
profitability. We define capital buffers as the difference between the observed capital of banks 
and the minimum capital requirements.  
Australia offers a unique setting to study the link between systemic risk and capital 
buffers as it overcomes the data constraint faced in many other economies for which bank data 
has not been collected through periods of significant financial distress for a wide cross-section 
of banks. The finding of variations in systemic risk for different time periods can hence, be 
extrapolated and read with interest for many other open economies with limited downturn data, 
which in total comprise a significant proportion of global banking assets. In this study, systemic 
risk is defined as the common shock to loan loss provisions in excess of anticipated loan loss 
provisions and existing capital levels. The detailed prudential data collected by the Australian 
Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) on Australian Deposit-taking Institutions is 
paramount to our objective to better understand the impact of bank capital on system-wide 
losses.  
Our study contributes to the existing banking literature (in particular within the Asia-
Pacific region) on banks’ credit losses and their interactions with financial system resilience 
																																																								
4 Admati and Hellwig (2014) propose increasing total bank capital from the current 13% to 25%. 
5 The Bank of England’s views have been acknowledged internationally in the context capital buffers. The Brexit 
referendum has had so far no consequence on bank capital regulations. It is unclear whether Britain will change 
these views in the future. 
6	See Cummings and Wright (2016).	
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and capital buffers in several ways. Firstly, we provide empirical evidence on the role of the 
inclusion of economic downturns in measuring systemic risk. To the best of our knowledge, 
this study is the first that analyses the systemic risk of the Australian banking system whilst 
accounting for business cycles. We highlight the importance of using an economic downturn 
period in the analysis of bank loan losses.  The evidence further suggests a possibility that 
banks that have adopted the internal ratings based (IRB) approach using recent data do not fully 
account for the likelihood of banking crises in their internal models and consequently may be 
undercapitalized during financial crises under the Basel capital adequacy framework. 
Secondly, we quantify the relationship between banks’ capital buffers and the size of 
the financial safety net. Most extant studies examine the direction of this relationship (see for 
instance, Thakor, 2014), yet few have looked at this aspect in measurable terms. Using our 
simulation study, we measure the size of financial safety nets based on the capital buffers and 
show that there is a non-linear impact on system resilience for larger capital buffers. The size 
of the Australian financial system protection schemes is measured by computing the absolute 
losses (in excess of capital buffers) in the system. These losses are not explained by loan loss 
provisioning models and hence, serve as a reflection of unexpected risk. Specifically, we 
examine two unconditional loss measures for systemic risk – Value-at-Risk (VaR) and 
Conditional Value-at-Risk (henceforth, Expected Shortfall). Our findings support the moderate 
capital buffer increase of about 2% on top of current levels as proposed by the Bank of England. 
Thirdly, we are able to affirm that higher loss rates lead to higher funding costs faced 
by banks, while the funding costs decrease as banks’ capital buffers increase. Specifically, an 
increase in banks’ capital buffers is associated with a reduction in the cost of debt financing. 
Furthermore, we also document a slight decrease in loan growth following an increase in capital 
levels. The results contribute to the debate regarding the trade-off between the benefit of 
lowering banks’ funding costs and the reduction in credit supply within the banking sector. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 summarises the relevant literature that 
motivate the current study. Section 3 outlines the data. Section 4 describes the research design, 
and presents the main empirical results and robustness checks. Section 5 discusses the 
controversial impacts of higher capital requirements. Section 6 concludes the paper. 
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2. Related literature 
2.1. Financial system resilience 
Our study relates to the growing literature on financial resilience. System resilience 
refers to the ability of the financial system to withstand or recover from losses, should they 
incur. The impact of system-wide losses on the real economy can be measured by examining 
the interconnections between the financial markets and various industry sectors. Banks are 
documented as the industry group that has most systemic risk in Australia (Dungey et al., 
2014). Other international studies also propose different methods for systemic risk modeling. 
For instance, Souza (2016) models the Brazilian banking system as a network of banks 
mutually exposed, in which the medium-sized banks can impose a significant contribution to 
systemic risk.  
As shown in prior studies, systemic risk levels can also be used to provide early warning 
signals for ensuing financial crises and is closely related to future economic downturns (Allen 
et al., 2012; Zhang et al., 2015; Acharya et al., 2017). 
The literature on Asian countries has mainly focused on market-based approaches to 
measuring systemic risk. Using equity price information, Fong et al. (2011) and Wong et al. 
(2011) assess the systemic risk, based on the Conditional Value-at-Risk, of the Hong Kong 
banking sector using loan loss provisioning and Merton default probabilities, respectively. To 
understand the build-up of systemic losses within a financial system, recent papers also 
measure the interconnectedness between banks and different sectors in the Australian economy 
and international markets (Dungey et al., 2016; Anufriev and Panchenko, 2015). More recently, 
Roesch and Scheule (2016) develop an econometric model to analyse systemic risk in relation 
to bank lending for Asian economies using bank portfolio loss rates. 
The related literature on bank financial resilience (Brownlees and Engle, 2017; Adrian 
and Brunnermeier, 2016; and Acharya et al., 2017) relies on traded share prices and credit 
default swap spreads that are available only for a small number of larger sized banks and this 
severely limits the usefulness of these existing systemic risk measures. Brownlees and Engle 
(2017) propose an index (SRISK) to capture the systemic risk contribution of a financial firm 
and the aggregate financial system using public information on market and firm returns. This 
index is measured by the expected capital shortage that a firm would experience in times of a 
substantial market decline, which is related to the conditional equity loss (i.e. Marginal 
Expected Shortfall).  
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 Similarly, Acharya et al. (2017) look at an individual bank’s contribution to systemic 
risk by measuring its systemic expected shortfall (SES) using bank assets, and the book and 
market value of equity. This SES measure is interpreted as the expected amount that a bank is 
undercapitalized in the event that the whole system is undercapitalized.  
On the other hand, Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016) suggest an alternative systemic 
risk measure, which is the conditional Value at Risk (CoVaR) of a financial sector conditioning 
on whether a bank has had a VaR exceeding loss. The main distinction between the systemic 
risk measures of Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016) and Acharya et al. (2017) is that the CoVaR 
measure looks at the system’s stress given that an individual firm is experiencing stress, while 
the latter analyses a financial firm’s stress conditional on a systemic stress. Their empirical 
analysis also uses equity prices for US publicly traded financial institutions.  
Sedunov (2016) compares different measures of institution-level systemic risk 
exposure and concludes that the CoVaR methodology gives the best forecasts of institutions’ 
within-crisis performance over several crisis periods. He modifies Adrian and Brunnermeier’s 
(2016) CoVaR to allow for more reliable forecasts of future systemic risk exposures.   
Our paper looks at the unconditional losses to the Australian financial system at the 
aggregate level. The approach taken delineates from existing work, as we do not analyse 
systemic risk in the sense of a systemic loss conditioning on individual banks’ failures (see 
Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2016) or the reverse causality of the impact of the financial system 
losses on individual financial institutions (see e.g., Acharya et al., 2017). Another key 
contribution is that the framework is completely independent from the efficiency of financial 
markets and the criticism made by Borio and Drehmann (2009) and Cerutti et al. (2012). They 
argue that the financial markets may be exposed to systematic under and/or over pricing, which 
results in a higher degree of systemic risk than under real-world measures. As such, the use of 
stock market data might pose challenges. Our framework provides a significant methodological 
contribution in that it uses non-market-based information and can be used to reliably assess 
financial institutions of all sizes. 
 
2.2. Capital buffer and capital regulation 
From a macro-prudential perspective, raising the level and quality of capital in the 
system is proposed as a way to ensure effective loss absorbing capacity. To mitigate the build-
up of systemic loss, the Basel Committee has focused on its two main dimensions, 
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procyclicality and interconnections between banks (Caruana, 2012). The countercyclical buffer 
aims to mitigate the former dimension while the requirement of higher loss absorbing capacity 
aims to resolve the latter. From January 2013, the new Basel III framework introduced a 
countercyclical buffer of between 0 and 2.5% of risk weighted assets (RWA), in addition to a 
conservation buffer for common equity Tier 1 capital of 2.5%, to protect the banking system 
during economic downturns (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2011 and 2014).  
Using a calibration technique, Miles et al. (2013) provide insights into the long-run 
costs and benefits of financing more of the assets with equity. The desirable amount of capital 
is estimated to be higher than the target level under Basel III. Regarding the procyclicality 
concern, Ayuso et al. (2004) find a negative relationship between the Spanish business cycle 
and capital buffers held by Spanish commercial and savings banks from 1986 to 2000. Their 
results suggest that an increase by one percentage point in GDP growth might reduce capital 
buffers by 17%. Other papers also confirm the benefits of holding higher capital. Heid (2007) 
looks into why the Basel capital buffers increase during the crises and finds that the capital 
buffer that banks hold on top of the required minimum capital plays a crucial role in mitigating 
the impact of the volatility of capital requirements due to risk changes. Thakor (2014) shows 
that higher capital is associated with higher lending, higher liquidity creation and banks’ value 
as well as their survival likelihood during the crises.  
By contrast, Cajueiro et al. (2011) use a sample of Brazillian banks for the period 2000-
2010 and find that the surplus capital is negatively related with loan growth. They also argue 
that in the economic turmoil, banks may reduce their loans as a way to increase their 
capitalization. Kosak et al. (2015) reconcile the controversial debate by showing that the 
interactions between banks’ capital and lending depend on the state of the economy. In an 
international bank sample, they find that during the crisis larger banks lend more if the Tier 1 
capital ratio of competing banks was low, but this pattern reverses in normal times. Further, 
Gambacorta and Shin (2016) look at the effect of bank capital on funding costs and lending 
growth using a sample of major international banks over the period 1994-2007. Cummings and 
Wright (2016) show theoretically that higher capital leads to lower cost of equity and debt and 
may lead to higher total funding costs. Higher total funding costs may result as the capital ratio 
increases and cost of equity is greater than the cost of debt.  
Our paper extends the current empirical literature on bank capital as it uniquely assesses 
the consequences of higher capital buffers on financial system resilience, cost of debt and credit 
supply.	
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2.3. Prediction of banks’ credit losses and their interactions 
Our study is also related to the extant literature focused on banks’ loan loss provisioning 
behaviour. This strand of the banking literature finds that bank characteristics and business 
cycles are important determinants of loss rates. Dermine and De Carvalho (2008) estimate 
dynamic provisions for non-performing loans of Portuguese banks over time. Other prior 
studies analyse the determinants of loan loss provisions using banks’ financial ratios and 
economic factors both in the US and abroad. Banks are found to increase capital levels when 
loan loss provisions decrease (Ahmed et al., 1999), postpone provisioning until negative 
economic conditions have set in (Laeven and Majnoni, 2003; Bikker and Metzemakers, 2005) 
and use loan loss provisions more extensively in crisis times (El Sood, 2012). Furthermore, in 
a global sample based on 16 major countries (including US, European countries and Japan) 
over 1997-2007, Foos et al. (2010) find that past loan growth has a significant and positive 
impact on banks’ loan loss provisions. In line with this finding, Fahlenbrach et al. (2017) show 
that banks with loan growth rates in the top quartile tend to increase their loan loss reserves 
following periods of high loan growth. 
With regard to Australia, Hess et al. (2009) study the determinants of credit losses at 
32 Australasian banks over 1980-2005 and conclude that loan growth is strongly related to 
credit losses in the next two to four years, with evidence of income smoothing patterns. Rodgers 
(2015) also studies credit losses using annual reports of Australian banks from 1980. The 
results indicate that business lending was the main driver of the credit losses experienced 
during the recession in the 1990s and also recently in the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). More 
recently, Cummings and Durrani (2016) examine the effects of the Basel capital requirements 
on the loan-loss provisioning practices of 22 Australian banks. The authors show that internal-
ratings based (IRB) banks use surplus regulatory capital to support their specific and general 
provisions after the adoption of the IRB framework.  
Overall, previous studies have focused exclusively on the prediction of loss rates for 
short horizons, usually over a one-year term. Our study provides a comprehensive assessment 
for multiple year loss rates. The analysis of multi-year loss rates is important as these reflect 
the banks’ exposure during distressed times when banks are unable to recapitalise. 
 
3. Data  
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3.1. Data sources 
We use financial data for Australian Authorised Deposit-taking Institutions (ADIs) 
from 2002 to 2014, collected and provided by the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority 
(APRA). All balance sheet and profit and loss items are analysed at the quarterly frequency 
and relate to the end of each quarter.  
We apply two data filters. First, we exclude banks with fewer than 15 quarters of 
observations, or missing values for the entire sample period. Second, we exclude financial 
companies classified as building societies, credit unions and foreign bank branches. The first 
filter allows us to have sufficient and reliable quarterly observations for our simulation study. 
Following Cummings and Durrani (2016), the second filter restricts our analysis to domestic 
banks. In addition, we drop outliers and extreme values by winsorizing financial ratios (except 
size) and regulatory capital variables at the 5th and 95th percentiles.7 The final sample is a panel 
data set that consists of 25 banks. These filter rules have a minor impact on the economic 
significance of our findings. As of the last quarter of the sample (2014:Q4), the Australian 
banking system has $3.2 trillion8 in assets, of which we analyse 90% of the total assets.  
There are several merits in using the APRA data. Firstly, this regulatory bank data 
allows us to identify the risk-weighted assets and capital requirements of banks. Secondly, the 
data is available for all licensed public and private banks. Thirdly, we are able to draw 
conclusions on the limitations of regulatory data to assess systemic risk. Fourthly, our funding 
cost analysis is timely as we are able to control for the repricing of bank liabilities.  
Despite its advantages, the data is only available for the period 2002-2014. This limits 
our ability to measure the financial system resilience in relation to economic downturns. To 
address this issue, we have hand collected an extended dataset using banks’ public annual 
reports and reconciled with the commercial (but lower coverage) Ausaspect database. We have 
a sample of 19 banks from 1978 to 20149. Note that six (generally smaller) banks have not 
published their annual accounts. This data includes the economic downturn in Australia in 
1991, which is generally seen as a major banking system crisis that affected both Australia and 
New Zealand simultaneously (see e.g., Hess et al., 2009). 
																																																								
7 We do not winsorize based on bank size (i.e., total assets) as this would compromise the representativeness of 
our sample banks in the Australian banking system. 
8 The value of total Australian banking assets is obtained from APRA data. It is calculated as the sum of all banks’ 
assets as of December 2014. 
9 Our annual data starts from 1978 to ensure two aspects: (1) having sufficient observations for estimation, and 
(2) capturing economic downturn in 1991.  
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The APRA data relates to the domestic books of licensed deposit-taking institutions 
while the annual data relates to the consolidated accounts, including foreign branches and 
subsidiaries. Despite this difference, we find consistent financial ratios for the two data sources 
indicating that they are comparable. For a consistent comparison with the annual sample, we 
annualise all our quarterly financial ratios (from APRA). Figure 1 reveals the patterns in total 
assets and loss rates over the sample period for quarterly and annual data. The shaded grey area 
depicts the periods when the GDP growth rate is negative. 
 
(insert Figure 1 about here) 
 
As seen in the first chart of Figure 1, the loss rates increased to about 0.5% per year in 
the GFC. The total assets follow an upward trend, which is consistent with our priors. As of 
2014, the sample banks account for total assets of $2.9 trillion. 
Since the annual report data collects banks’ financials on a consolidated holding level, 
the total assets from the second chart are slightly higher than the reported values in the first one 
for the commercial banks. Overall, the same patterns in banks’ loss rates and assets are shown 
in both figures. Interestingly, the increase of loss rates during the recent GFC is not as dramatic 
as the one observed during the Australian banking crisis in 1991. The average yearly loss rate 
increased to approximately 0.7% in 1992 (following the economic downturn in the prior year). 
This fact reinforces the importance of our analysis in investigating the banks’ loss rates and 
unconditional losses using data, which covers the major economic downturn in 1991.  
 
3.2. Capital variables for simulations 
The APRA enforces capital adequacy of all Australian banks. In 2013, APRA 
implemented Basel III and increased the requirements for both the quality and quantity of 
regulatory capital. As a result, the composition of Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital has also changed. 
Tier 1 capital must be at least 6% (of RWA), of which 4.5% must be from common equity. The 
combination of Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital must be at least 8% of the risk-weighted assets. 
Regarding the capital buffer levels, APRA requires all locally incorporated ADIs to hold a 
capital buffer consisting of three components: a capital conservation buffer (2.5% of risk-
	 	 	 		
	
10
weighted assets), a countercyclical capital buffer (currently set at 0%) and an additional buffer 
(1% of risk-weighted assets) for domestically systemically important bank (D-SIB).  
For our study, we require detailed information on the banks’ observed and regulatory 
capital in the APRA data, including Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital and total risk-weighted assets. 
Tier 1 capital consists of high-quality capital with which a bank can cover losses without 
bankruptcy, such as core capital and retained earnings, while the sum of book value of Tier 1 
and Tier 2 capital represents the observed capital (ܶܫܧܴ_ܥܣܲ) that banks hold. We define the 
regulatory capital (ܴܧܩ_ܥܣܲ) as the minimum level of capital that banks are required to hold, 
which is 8% of a bank’s total risk-weighted assets. In addition, a countercyclical and a capital 
conservation buffer are required under Basel III, which may cover credit losses in severe 
economic downturns. We assume that the whole capital buffer is available for loss absorption 
should loan losses exceed expectations. The consequence of this assumption is that the 
countercyclical capital buffer and the capital conservation buffer can be used to reduce the 
losses. Therefore, a bank’s capital buffer (ܥܣܲ_ܤܷܨܨܧܴ ) is calculated as the difference 
between the book value of observed capital and the regulatory capital threshold excluding the 
capital conservation buffer and the countercyclical capital buffer.  
 
4. Dynamics of loss rates, capital buffer and system resilience 
4.1. Research design	
This study is divided into two parts, which (i) analyse bank portfolio level loss rates 
and (ii) relate bank credit losses and capital buffers to system losses. Our approach is 
summarised in Figure 2.  
 
(insert Figure 2 about here) 
 
We analyse two datasets that mainly differ in their coverage to fully utilise their 
advantages and limit shortcomings. The quarterly APRA data includes detailed level 
information on regulatory capital but is limited in the time series as it starts in 2002. The 
observation subjects are commercial banks. The annual data starts in 1978 and covers the 
severe economic downturn of 1991 but provides less information on regulatory capital, as this 
disclosure is not mandated.  Observation subjects are bank holding companies. 
	 	 	 		
	
11
 
 Stage 1: Model estimation of loss rates 
In the first stage, we model the average loss rate using (a) APRA data and (b) annual 
data. We apply various reference periods for the dependent variable: one year, two years and 
three years for both (a) and (b).  
In reference to Roesch and Scheule (2016), we employ a panel mixed model to predict 
future credit losses using contemporaneous bank-level and macroeconomic variables. This 
allows the residuals to be decomposed into a systematic risk exposure ሺߝ௧ାଵ,ఛ) and a bank-
idiosyncratic risk exposure (ߝ௜,௧ାଵ,ఛ). The estimation model is as follows10: 
 
ܮܴ௜,௧ାଵ,ఛ ൌ ߙ௜ ൅ ߚ ௜ܺ,௧ ൅ ߛߝ௧ାଵ,ఛ ൅ ߜߝ௜,௧ାଵ,ఛ	    (1) 
 
The dependent variable for our regression is the average loss rate of bank i over a 
window of one-year, two-years and three-years ahead (where τ is 1, 2 and 3 years, respectively) 
from t+111. We define loss rates (ܮܴ) as the flow measure of provisions for credit impairments 
scaled by total assets.12 The loss rates include losses in relation to credit portfolios, other 
investments and contingent guarantee contracts (such as standby letters of credit). To examine 
the predictions of loss rates at different time intervals, our annualised loss rates are leading by 
one year, two years and three years. The bank-level intercept (ߙ௜) controls for unobservable 
heterogeneity across the banks. The parameters ߛ  and ߜ  are the standard deviations of the 
standard normally distributed random variables, ߝ௧ାଵ,ఛ	and	ߝ௜,௧ାଵ,ఛ.		Roesch and Scheule (2016) 
show that the mixture over standard normal random variables reflects tail risk. A set of 
explanatory variables is represented by the vector ௜ܺ,௧  including current bank-level 
characteristics and macro-economic factors.  
																																																								
10 We use the mixed models for the main results and a standard Ordinary Least Square (OLS) model for robustness. 
We have also confirmed that the linear prediction in the mixed model is comparable with the one resulting from 
the OLS model. 
11	For example, when t+1=2002:Q1, the average loss rate over one, two and three years will be calculated for the 
periods 2002:Q2-2003:Q1 (߬ ൌ 1), 2002:Q2-2004:Q1 (߬ ൌ 2) and 2002:Q2-2005:Q1 (߬ ൌ 3), respectively.	
12 Note that this variable is referred as ‘Charge for bad and doubtful debts (data sheet ARF_330_0_L). A stock 
measure does not accurately reflect the change in loan loss provision as it could be declining in the current period 
due to some asset write-offs in earlier years even when new bad loans are incurred (compare Hess et al., 2008 and 
2009). Further, the use of a stock measure may dilute our econometric results as it aggregates over provisions 
generated over multiple periods. We address this issue by using the flow measure as opposed to the stock variable 
of loan loss provisions. Further, we focus on the bank loss rates rather than the net income or trading income, as 
loss rates are a cleaner measure of the credit risk exposure. 
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The first set of determinants includes bank-specific financial performance ratios (such 
as the liquidity ratio, loan growth, housing loan ratio, deposit, profitability, and size). The 
relation between banks’ liquidity (ܮܫܳ) and credit losses is expected to be negative, as banks 
with larger holdings of liquid assets would face lower credit losses from holding fewer loans. 
Following Foos et al. (2010), we use the two-year lagged value of loan growth (ܮܱܣܰ_ܩܴ) as 
opposed to current loan growth to account for the possibility that banks may not realise the 
losses relating to their loan portfolio until after some time13. We expect lagged loan growth to 
be positively related to loss rates. This is because banks tend to relax underwriting standards 
to expand credit supply, which would lead to greater credit risk exposure14. We also include 
the housing loan ratio (ܪܮܱܣܰ) due to the concentration of Australian banks’ in this category. 
It is anticipated that the housing loans would be negatively associated with future loss rates, as 
they are real estate-backed and generally imply lower loss rates. We have no prior expectations 
of the coefficients on deposit funding (ܦܧܲ), size (ܵܫܼܧ) and profitability (ܴܱܲܨܫܶ). For 
example, large banks could either engage in riskier loans, which leads to a positive relation 
between bank size and loan losses, or they could be subject to greater market scrutiny and 
prudential monitoring that trigger lower future loss rates.  
Regarding regulatory changes, the introduction of the International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS) may have had an impact on loan loss rates. The accounting standards that 
were first adopted from January 2005 may have led banks to write back their losses, resulting 
in the decline in loss rates in the following periods. We control for the impact of the IFRS 
introduction by including a dummy variable that takes a value of one for the periods 2004:Q4 
and 2005:Q1 for the APRA data and zero otherwise15. 
Lastly, to capture the effect of the business cycle on banks’ credit losses we include 
GDP growth (ܩܦܲ_ܩܴ) and the change in unemployment rate (ܷܰܧܯܲ_ܩܴ). We expect to 
observe a negative relationship between GDP growth and loss rates, but a positive relationship 
																																																								
13 For robustness, we also use current loan growth, and other lag orders in the estimation model. The results remain 
qualitatively the same. 
14 It is also consistent with the evidence for the Japanese commercial banks (see Vithessonthi (2016) who finds 
that the bank loan supply increases the level of non-performing loans). 
15 Similarly, the IFRS binary variable for the annual sample is set to be one for the years 2004 and 2005. We do 
not observe major changes in the loss rates following the introduction of the accounting standard IFRS 9 (such as 
increased loss rates in future years due to loan loss provisioning that relate to the lifetime of financial instruments 
rather than the current one-year reference period) in 2014 and the mergers between Commonwealth Bank of 
Australia and Bankwest, and between Westpac Banking Corporation and St George. Hence, we do not include 
indicator variables for those events. 
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between the unemployment rate and loss rates. We summarise the definitions and data sources 
for all variables used in this study in Table 1.  
 
(insert Table 1 about here) 
 
 
Stage 2: Simulation of system losses 
In the second stage, we apply the three-year loss rate models in a simulation study to 
assess the impact of three-year cumulative bank losses. Monte Carlo simulation is a popular 
technique to analyse future outcomes based on credible assumptions. For example, Miles et al. 
(2013) analyse the optimal capital levels of banks simulating per capita GDP. In our analysis 
we simulate correlated bank loan loss provisions and compare these to bank capital buffers. 
The bank level losses are then aggregated to the financial system level. 
We choose a time horizon of three-years to reflect the fact that banks may be unable to 
recapitalise for such an extended period during severe economic downturns and capital buffers 
should be able to cover multi-period losses (compare Kupiec and Ramirez, 2013). For the 
simulation study, we use the latest period (2014:Q4) of the APRA data for both the model 
estimated with APRA data and the model estimated with annual data. Note that 19 banks 
remain in the APRA sample at the end of 2014 (while 25 banks were in the sample at the start). 
The count reduction is due to mergers. For example, Adelaide Bank and Bendigo Bank formed 
a new company (namely Bendigo and Adelaide Bank) in November 2007 and the 
Commonwealth Bank of Australia (CBA) acquired Bank West in 2008 while St George merged 
with Westpac in the same year. In other words, we include both entities before the merger and 
the combined entity thereafter in our estimation sample.16  
Next, we obtain the standard deviations of ߝ௧ାଵ,ఛ	and	ߝ௜,௧ାଵ,ఛ, total assets and capital 
buffer for each bank. Since the annual data does not have detailed information about the banks’ 
regulatory capital we apply the values computed for the APRA sample as of 2014:Q4 to those 
in the annual sample. In particular, we apply the capital buffers and total assets for the 19 banks 
from the APRA sample to the annual sample.  
																																																								
16 Further, we have interpolated the values for gross loans and assets during periods of mergers to control for 
related changes. An alternative assumption would be the exclusion of the target firm from the sample and leads 
to consistent results. 	
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Table 2 displays the descriptive statistics for the main variables of interest for the APRA 
dataset and annual dataset for the full sample in Panel A and the Pearson correlation matrix of 
these variables in Panel B. From Column I of Panel A, the annualised loss rate averages at 
0.29% per year. Loan growth is measured as the annualised percentage change in loans relative 
to the previous year. We report the annualised loan growth for the two-year lag as 11.45%. The 
capital ratio is defined as total equity to total assets and has a mean of 9.94%. 
Panel B shows that the correlation coefficient of 0.42 between ܥܣܲ	and ܴܱܲܨܫܶ	is 
moderate. To avoid the multicollinearity problem, we run the mixed models including both 
ܥܣܲ	and ܴܱܲܨܫܶ, and one variable at a time17. The results are consistent and we report the 
estimation results using the ܴܱܲܨܫܶ	variable, as it is less correlated with other factors, such as 
ܦܧܲ and ܵܫܼܧ.  
 
(insert Table 2 about here) 
 
We compare the statistics of the sample banks in both data sets for 2014 to ensure that 
both data sets are comparable. From Panel C, it can be seen that both samples are comparable 
and that both data sets have the same sample size of 19 banks for the simulation. We simulate 
the realisations for ߝ௧ାଵ,ఛ	and	ߝ௜,௧ାଵ,ఛ	 based on one million iterations to conduct several 
sensitivity analyses. As described in Section 3.2, we relate both the banks’ loss rates and capital 
buffers to total assets for consistency in the simulation process. Both observed and regulatory 
capital levels are often defined as fractions of total risk-weighted assets as in the proposals 
made by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. Hence, we calculate the risk-weighted 
asset (RWA) density ratio to convert our computed capital buffers to the definitions adopted to 
the regulatory framework. The density ratio is expressed as the fraction of RWA to total assets. 
Note that this additional computation is used to facilitate our interpretation of results, and that 
we use the excess capital to total assets ratio in all the estimation and simulation steps. 
We develop an economic framework, where bank default occurs if losses exceed capital 
buffers and regulatory capital releases (compare Merton, 1974). Capital buffers 
(ܥܣܲ_ܤܷܨܨܧܴ ) and the regulatory capital threshold are reported by APRA in 2014:Q4. 
Conditional on the simulated values of ߝ௧ାଵ,ఛ	and	ߝ௜,௧ାଵ,ఛ, we compute the values for the loss 
																																																								
17 The robustness checks lead to similar residual parameters. 
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per bank and the loss of the financial system (that is, the sum of all positive losses). We then 
compute the various measures for unconditional loss by analysing moments of the distributions. 
These loss measures are based on one million iterations for the sample banks, using APRA and 
annual data. These numbers are sufficient to ensure convergence, i.e., the simulated Value-at-
Risk changes by less than 0.1% if the data sample is doubled. This results in simulated losses, 
which we aggregate by value weighting with total assets and summing over the sample banks. 
Bank ݅ in period ߬ fails if losses exceed the capital buffer: 
 
ܦ௜,௧ାଵ,ఛ ൌ 1 ⇔ 				ߛߝ௧ାଵ,ఛ ൅ ߜߝ௜,௧ାଵ,ఛᇣᇧᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇧᇥ				
		௦௛௢௖௞ୀ௨௡௘௫௣௘௖௧௘ௗ	௟௢௦௦	௥௔௧௘
൐ ܥܣܲ_ܤܷܨܨܧܴ௜,௧ାଵ																										ሺ5ሻ 
 
Note that this is an important consideration, as in a going concern scenario, a bank is 
required to continue to meet the regulatory capital requirements. Losses in excess of the capital 
buffer would have to be covered by investors or other stakeholders including the broader 
society. Further, it is worth noting that we analyse the unexpected shock that represents the 
components that banks do not provide provisions for ex-ante (i.e., ߛߝ௧ାଵ,ఛ ൅ ߜߝ௜,௧ାଵ,ఛ) and are 
not explained by observable bank characteristics. This is the total unexpected shock, which is 
comprised of two sources of risk: ߝ௧ାଵ,ఛ (i.e., systemic risk) and ߝ௜,௧ାଵ,ఛ (i.e., bank-systematic 
risk). The banks’ unexpected shock is usually associated with borrower characteristics that can 
lead to bank default. Although we would expect that the banks would receive government 
social support (which we measure in the following) if their capital buffers were depleted, they 
would not be allowed to operate if the capital level were below the minimum requirement. 
Loss exceedances are weighted by total assets (ܶܣ௜,ఛ) and aggregated to gauge system-
wide losses:  
ܮ௜,௧ାଵ,ఛ ൌ෍ܶܣ௜,௧ାଵ
௃
௜ୀଵ
. ሺߛߝ௧ାଵ,ఛ ൅ ߜߝ௜,௧ାଵ,ఛ െ ܥܣܲ_ܤܷܨܨܧܴ௜,௧ାଵሻ																								ሺ6ሻ 
 
We assume that banks provision for the anticipated loss rate (ߙ௜ ൅ ߚ ௜ܺ,௧) and that the 
realised shock to the loss rate (ߛߝ௧ାଵ,ఛ ൅ ߜߝ௜,௧ାଵ,ఛ) is netted with the capital buffer. Note that 
we only consider the positive losses in excess of the capital buffer. We interpret these as losses 
the bank is unable to bear on its own as a going concern scenario as a bank is required to 
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continue to meet the regulatory capital requirements. In other words, such a bank would have 
to rely on external support to survive, which may include contributions from investors or other 
stakeholders.  
As a result, we compute the following loss measures for the simulated loss vector: (i) 
unconditional Value-at-Risk (VaR) and (ii) unconditional Expected Shortfall (CVaR). The 
Value-at-Risk (VaR) refers to a quantile of the loss distributions. For instance, a 99.9% VaR 
of a loan portfolio is the loss value such that a greater loss would only happen in 0.1% of all 
cases.  The Expected Shortfall (CVaR) is defined as the expectation of losses exceeding VaR. 
These are the VaR and CVaR of the system wide losses and are measured in absolute terms. 
We refer to these measures as proxies for systemic risk.  
 
4.2. Analysis of the loss rate determinants (Stage 1) 
We estimate the loss rates for different time horizons, ߬, which are the one-year, the 
two-year and the three-year horizon using Equation (1). The economic interpretation is that 
banks may not have access to capital markets in severe economic downturns and hence, can 
only recapitalise after an extended period of time. We aim to analyse the relevance of bank 
fundamentals for the estimation of future loss rates. 
As the dependent variables relate to the next year, the next two years and the next three 
years, they enable us to consider losses to the system over different horizons. All loss rates are 
reported on an annual basis, which is in line with market standards. Table 3 presents the 
estimation results for the APRA and annual data.  
 
(insert Table 3 about here) 
 
First, we analyse the results for the APRA data 18 . The coefficient on (ܮܫܳ ) is 
significantly positive, which suggests that liquid banks are more engaged in riskier loans and 
hence, resulting in higher future loss rates. The coefficient for the second year lag of loan 
growth (ܮܱܣܰ_ܩܴ) has a positive sign, which is as expected and consistent with Foos et al. 
																																																								
18 The results are consistent if we estimate the models at a yearly frequency using the APRA data (i.e., one 
observation per bank and year). For robustness, we also run the regressions using non-winsorized data and obtain 
similar residual parameters for the simulation analysis. 
	 	 	 		
	
17
(2010) and Fahlenbrach et al. (2017). In our case, the low economic significance may be 
explained by the fact that Australian banks are more conservative and have more stringent 
credit assessment procedures so that the banks are not greatly exposed to low-quality loans. 
Another interesting result is that ܦܧܲ exhibits significantly negative coefficients for all 
regressions for the APRA data. The negative coefficient for ܵܫܼܧ suggests that bank size is 
negatively related to loan loss rates. Larger banks, with more deposit funding, are less risky 
and are exposed to lower losses than smaller banks. Further, large banks often hold a more 
diversified portfolio, and hence, are able to reduce their idiosyncratic shock and exposure to 
credit losses. Moreover, we observe a negative effect on future loss rates from the introduction 
of IFRS in 2005. This is in line with our expectations. The coefficient of ܩܦܲ_ܩܴ	 is 
consistently negative (though significant at the 5% level for the one-year loss prediction). This 
result implies that banks’ loss rates increase during times of distress, supporting the procyclical 
behaviour of loss provisioning documented in other studies (see e.g., Bikker and Metzemakers, 
2005)19. 
Turning to the annual data, it is interesting to see that the signs of the coefficients for 
bank liquidity, deposit funding and size are reversed when we use the annual data for 
estimation. The negative coefficient on ܮܫܳ	is as expected, since banks with more liquid assets 
would have smaller loan portfolios and thus are less likely to have high credit loss rates. The 
positive coefficients on ܦܧܲ and ܵܫܼܧ mean that banks, which are larger and funded by more 
deposits, are associated with higher future loss rates.  
In sum, future loss rates are dependent on current loan losses, banks’ overall risk 
characteristics and the market’s credit condition. We find that future credit loss rates are 
positively associated with lagged loan growth, implying that banks increase their credit 
impairment charge for new loans supplied. Our results are in line with those found in Laeven 
and Majnoni (2003) and Bikker and Metzemakers (2005). Further, we find support to the 
argument by Danielsson (2002) and Hess et al. (2009), in which the estimates gained with 
																																																								
19 Given that the GDP growth rate (GDP_GR) and the change in the rate of employment (UNEMP_GR) are both 
indicators of the cyclical state of an economy (Hess et al., 2009), we use the GDP growth rate for the main baseline 
results, and include the unemployment rate as a robustness check. In an unreported table, the coefficient 
UNEMP_GR is significantly positive and is in line with our prior expectations. When unemployment increases, 
borrowers are more likely to default on the loans and hence, banks would experience higher numbers of loan 
defaults and greater loss rates in subsequent periods. The significance of UNEMP_GR is reduced when the GDP 
growth rate is also taken into account. In summary, our main results are robust to the use of different model 
specifications and variables.  
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longer time series and inclusion of the downturn may differ from the ones based on banks’ 
factors in the normal times.  
We show the performance of the model for predicting future loss rates in Figure 3 and 
Figure 4 for the APRA and annual data, respectively. Note that loss rates relate to the start of 
the reference period. The predicted line tends to understate the observed losses during 
economic downturns. This implies that by relying on banks’ internal models to estimate future 
loss rates, banks under-charge for losses in times of instability (for example, the GFC in mid-
2008) and ultimately end up with unexpected losses that exceed the provisioned amount. The 
results underline the importance of capital buffers so that banks are able to absorb unexpected 
losses should they occur.  
 
(insert Figures 3 and 4 about here) 
 
4.3. Analysis of the Australian financial system resilience (Stage 2) 
4.3.1. Roadmap for the research results 
In this section, we explore the value of capital buffers in maintaining the resilience of 
Australian financial system. This is examined through a number of different tests. Our baseline 
simulation of the system losses utilises the actual capital buffers of banks reported in 2014:Q4, 
and is based on the 99.9% confidence level and a three-year risk horizon20. From this baseline 
simulation, we conduct several sensitivity tests. It is worth noting that for each sensitivity 
analysis we only change one parameter at a time to study the impact of that element on the 
system loss. Firstly, we vary the confidence interval between 95% and 99.995%, while other 
parameters remain unchanged. This is to study the sensitivity of the system losses to varying 
levels of confidence. The remaining tests are based on the 99.9% confidence interval, as in the 
baseline simulation. 
Secondly, we examine the effects of capital buffers on the system loss. To do this, we 
replace the banks’ actual capital buffers with a set of hypothetical capital buffers (ranging from 
0.25% to 5%), while holding other inputs constant. Unlike the actual capital buffers, the 
hypothetical buffers are fixed across all banks. The interpretation is to observe the system loss 
																																																								
20 We choose to use the 99.9% confidence level in the baseline simulation, as it is consistent with the Internal-
Ratings Based (IRB) approach in Basel III. 
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if all banks in the Australian banking system were to hold the same fixed capital buffer. Note 
that all hypothetical buffers in tables, charts and analyses are expressed in terms of RWA. 
Thirdly, we extend the analysis on the impact of capital buffers by looking at the 
hypothetical capital buffers in addition to actual capital buffers. That is, we set the capital 
buffers to be the sum of actual capital buffers and a range of hypothetical increments. This is 
to answer the question: If banks were to hold an additional capital cushion on top of their 
existing level, how would that impact system losses?  
Fourthly, we analyse the impact on the financial system losses when the banks hold just 
the minimum required capital buffers and no further capital. 
 
4.3.2. Simulation results 
I. Baseline results and sensitivity to the confidence levels. 
Table 4 describes the empirical distribution for the exceedance ratio (i.e., the number 
of instances where the capital buffer is insufficient to cover excess losses over all iterations) 
and the loss measures for the financial system, using a set of different confidence levels. The 
simulated loss measures are based on the actual capital buffers of the 19 Australian ADIs in 
the sample in 2014. In Table 6, Panel A displays the simulated results for the APRA data and 
Panel B displays the results for the annual data.  
 
(insert Table 4 about here) 
	
Using the APRA data, the mean CVaR for the Australian banking system is 
$175.4million21 for the 99.9% confidence interval. The number reflects the tail of the simulated 
distribution of aggregated loss exceedances given the state of banks and the economy in 
2014:Q4. The CVaR measure is higher for annual data than for the APRA data as it includes 
the economic downturn in 1991. The mean CVaR for the financial system is $6.5 billion for 
the 99.9th percentile. This is due to the banking crisis, which translates into greater estimates 
for ߛ22. Similarly, this is also the reason why the simulated risk measures using the annual 
																																																								
21 Note that all the reported numbers for VaRs and CVaRs are based on Australian dollars in 2014. 
22 We have tested the residuals, ߝ௧ାଵ→ఛ	and	ߝ௜,୲ାଵ→ఛ from the Stage 1 estimation for normality (null hypothesis) 
using a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. For the three-year horizon, the p-values are 0.091 (APRA data) and 0.047 
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sample are generally higher than the ones obtained using APRA data. We also report the 
proportions of exceedances over the one million iterations23. For the 99.9% confidence level, 
on average 0.0001 and 0.002 banks fail for APRA and annual data, respectively. These 
exceedance ratios are broadly in line with the confidence levels imposed by the regulators. It 
is important to note that the exceedance ratios are identical for different confidence intervals. 
Moreover, in some cases we obtain positive CVaRs whilst the VaR measures are zero. This is 
of no concern as VaR is based on the probability level while the expected shortfall is the 
average of all losses exceeding VaR. However, CVaR increases with the confidence level as 
fewer zero loss scenarios are included.  
We conduct a robustness check to ensure that the difference between annual and APRA 
data can be attributed to the experience of an economic downturn in 1991. We have restricted 
the annual data to the period 2002:2014 and re-estimated the models which resulted in a 
γ=0.056 and a δ=0.100 and are lower than γ=0.190 and a δ=0.124 for the full sample. The 
simulation of system losses results in a 99.9% VaR of zero and a 99.9% CVaR of $50,448 
which is substantially smaller than for the full sample reported in Table 4. 
As a further robustness check, we repeat the simulation study using five million 
iterations. This is to ensure that our simulation results satisfy the convergence criteria. Our 
results remain quantitatively the same, confirming that the choice of one million iterations is 
sufficient to simulate robust loss measures. 
 
II. Impact of hypothetical capital buffers  
Figure 5 shows the negative relation between the capital buffers and banks’ loss 
distributions using APRA (first chart) and annual data (second chart). The pattern is consistent 
with our expectations since increases in capital buffers allow banks to become more resilient. 
Therefore, the system VaRs become smaller and eventually diminish to zero beyond a certain 
level of capital buffers. A similar pattern can also be found when we examine the relation 
between the exceedance ratio and the capital buffers. The higher the capital buffer, the lower 
the exceedance ratio. The loss measures are generally higher for annual data than for the APRA 
data, as the latter has been calibrated to the economic downturn in 1991. At a capital buffer of 
2.5%, the simulated CVaRs for the APRA and annual data sets are approximately $4.8 billion 
																																																								
(annual data) for 	ߝ௜,୲ାଵ→ఛ and 0.010 (APRA and annual data) for ߝ௧ାଵ→ఛ. As a result, we reject normality in some 
instances and 	ߝ௜,୲ାଵ→ఛ  is more normal than 	ߝ୲ାଵ→ఛ. This is in line with our prior expectation that normality may 
not strictly hold in the time series. However, heavy tails may suggest much lower p-values. 
23 The exceedance ratio is the likelihood of default, which ranges between zero and one. 
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and $27.9 billion, respectively. The higher number for the annual data is due to the inclusion 
of the banking crisis, which drives the magnitude of these values. For higher capital buffer 
levels above 1.75%, the diminishing pattern in the risk measures for the APRA data is steadier 
relative to the decline as observed for the annual data. Our study estimates the response rate at 
which the loss dissipates corresponding to an increase in capital buffers.  
 
(insert Figure 5 about here) 
 
III. Impact of hypothetical capital buffers in addition to actual capital buffers  
We now analyse hypothetical capital buffers in addition to actual capital buffers and 
find strong evidence to support our previous findings. Higher capital buffers help banks, and 
eventually the financial system, to avoid future system losses. Further, the rate at which the 
loss declines in value is diminishing as capital buffers strengthen. The results support the 
increase of banks’ capital buffers as a means of promoting financial system resilience in 
Australia. Using the APRA data, the system loss can be mitigated with an additional capital 
buffer of 2% on top of the banks’ current levels. The results are summarised in Figure 6. 
 
(insert Figure 6 about here) 
 
IV. Impact of minimum capital buffers  
Our next analysis looks at the impact on the financial system losses when the banks 
hold the minimum required capital buffers. In accordance to the Basel framework, the capital 
conservation buffer of 2.5% is applied on all ADIs, while the countercyclical capital buffer is 
currently set at 0%. For large banks that are classified as domestic systematically important 
banks (D-SIBs), they are required by APRA to hold an additional 1% of capital to enhance 
their loss-absorbing capacity. 
In Table 5, we repeat the baseline simulation results under two scenarios. First, we 
display the results for the current setting in Column I, whereby the D-SIBs hold a total capital 
buffer of 3.5% and the remaining banks’ capital buffer is 2.5% of risk-weighted assets. Second, 
Column II shows the simulated system losses under a future setting, in which the 
	 	 	 		
	
22
countercyclical capital buffer of 2.5% becomes effective. Hence, the D-SIBs and smaller banks 
will hold 6% and 5% of risk-weighted assets as their capital buffers, respectively.  
 
(insert Table 5 about here) 
 
The results reveal that in the current setting, the conditional system losses are 
substantial and that the overall financial system would be more susceptible to large losses in 
the event of market distress. As APRA raises the countercyclical capital buffer from 0% to 
2.5% of risk-weighted assets in accordance with the new Basel III capital requirements the 
system-wide losses will significantly reduce. We further highlight the need for banks to 
increase the level of capital buffers to maintain the resilience of the whole financial system. 
Table 6 summarises our main findings. With regard to the controversy on the size of 
capital requirements, we find support for moderate additional capital levels as proposed by the 
Bank of England (2016). The capital buffers necessary to mitigate systemic losses are within 
5% and hence, within the level of buffers provided by the capital maintenance buffer and the 
countercyclical capital buffer. Hence, only minor increases should be necessary. 
 
(insert Table 6 about here) 
 
4.4. Sub-sample results for IRB and non-IRB banks	
 In this section we divide the sample banks into two groups, banks that apply the Internal-
Ratings-Based (IRB banks) approach under Basel and non-IRB banks, and examine their 
ability to absorb loan losses. Cummings & Durrani (2016) list five of the largest banks that 
apply the IRB approach and find that these banks provide lower general provisions. The result 
for our study would be that IRB banks might experience a greater shock in economic 
downturns.  
 As reported in Panel A of Table 7, non-IRB banks hold higher capital levels relative to 
their counterparts. The non-IRB banks are generally smaller in size, hold higher capital buffers 
and are less profitable. In the fourth quarter of 2014, an average IRB bank holds about 4.64% 
while a non-IRB bank holds 7.92 % of capital buffers in excess of their regulatory capital 
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requirement (in terms of risk weighted assets). The difference in capital buffers between the 
two groups is 3.27% (significant at the 5% level) for 2014:Q4. Due to the concentration and 
importance of the large IRB banks in the financial system, their failure can dampen the effect 
of the capital buffer on system loss more markedly. The RWA density ratios of the two bank 
groups are relatively similar, which averages of about 65%.  
 
(insert Table 7 about here) 
 
 We report the simulation results for two sub-groups in Panel B. First, we present the 
baseline results for the APRA and the annual data. Given that the annual data includes the 
downturn period, the loss measures in Column II are higher than those in Column I. We 
highlight again the need to include the economic downturn data in the analyses of bank losses.  
 Turning to the comparison between the two sub-bank groups, it is evident that IRB 
banks contribute to a larger system loss. For the annual data, the system CVaRs are $6.4billion 
and $104 million for IRB banks and non-IRB banks, respectively.24  
 One could argue that the result is driven by their size differential as the IRB banks are 
larger (accounting for about $2.5 trillion in total assets, while non-IRB banks’ assets 
accumulate to about $300 billion) and hence, are more systemically important. To control for 
this size effect, we set the sum of total assets for the non-IRB banks equal to that of the IRB 
banks. That is, both groups have a hypothetical level of total assets of $2.5 trillion. We then 
divide this total by 14 banks in the non-IRB group so that each bank is equally weighted. We 
run the simulation using the APRA and annual data, and report the results in Column III. The 
results remain qualitatively the same. By having higher total assets, the loss measures for the 
non-IRB banks increase substantially but they are still lower than those attributed by the IRB 
banks. Consequently, banks that have higher capital buffers are less likely to cause losses. 
 In summary, our findings indicate that the losses coming from banks that use the IRB 
approach under the Basel requirements are susceptible towards larger losses than those that 
rely on the non-IRB approach. This result persists when controlling for the size of banks. The 
																																																								
24 There is anecdotal evidence from the US that these numbers reflect the size of losses of a financial system under 
severe economic stress. The net asset value US Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) dropped by $73.3 
billion between 2007 and 20.9 billion. Despite many differences between the Australian and US financial systems, 
one of which is size, these numbers are in line with our expectations based on these numbers. 
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finding has an important bearing on the equal level playing field across banks and across 
countries. In particular, large banks usually in big countries may get competitive advantage 
over small banks in small countries for which IRB approach is too costly to employ. Further, 
Goodhart (2013) suggests that a way to reduce the systemic losses is to limit the size of a bank 
to a manageable level, and to classify banks as systematically important financial institutions 
when their failures could result in large costs both to the taxpayers and the economy. Our results 
complement the current debate on raising capital buffers and reinforces that the focus of the 
debate should be on large IRB banks.  
 
5. The costs and benefits of raising higher capital  
Despite the benefits of having higher capital requirements, the recent debate amongst 
practitioners and academics has focused on the trade-offs between lower system loss and the 
costs of higher equity. Apart from lower system losses, another benefit of having a stronger 
capital base is for banks to improve their credit risk. Banks that have high capital buffers, and 
lower loss rates are seen to be safer relative to their counterparts and thus, are able to enjoy 
cheaper cost of debt and equity. However, the cost of equity is greater than the cost of debt and 
an increase of capital may imply greater total funding costs. Furthermore, funding constraints 
may imply lower lending volumes. 
To shed light on this debate, we test the impact of capital on banks’ funding cost and 
lending activities. For our analysis, we use three proxies for funding costs, including the spread 
on debt that is refinanced over the next three months (ܴܵܲ_ܴܨ), spread on total refinanced debt 
(ܴܵܲ_ܴܶܨ) and the spread on banks’ total liabilities (ܴܵܲ_ܴܦ)25. We regress each of the three 
measures above on capital buffer and other controls using an OLS model26. For robustness, we 
replace the variable ܥܣܲ_ܤܷܨܨܧܴ with the loss rate measure, ܮܴ, and capital ratio, ܥܣܲ. 
Unlike the traditional capital-to-asset ratio that does not distinguish among banks with similar 
capital level but facing different regulatory constraints, the capital buffer directly accounts for 
the regulatory requirements (Gambacorta and Mistrulli, 2004; Cajueiro et al., 2011). Our 
expectation is that higher capital buffers are associated with a lower cost of debt, as there would 
be a positive association between loan loss rates and funding costs. Regarding the impacts on 
																																																								
25 Note that the observations for the estimation model of refinanced debt are low due to the fact that banks only 
started to report refinanced liabilities from 2008 onwards. The detailed information about banks’ repriced debt is 
only available from APRA. In addition, the estimation results are robust with and without the bank and time fixed 
effects. 
26 The explanatory variables are one-quarter lagged, and we cluster the standard errors at the bank and time levels. 
We confirm that our results using the GMM estimation are similar to those reported.  
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lending activity, we anticipate a negative association between the capital buffers and the growth 
in bank lending. 
 
 
(insert Table 8 about here) 
 
 We report the results for banks’ funding costs and lending in Panels A and B of Table 
8, respectively. We obtain a negative and significant coefficient for the lagged capital buffer 
across all three specifications. The impact is more pronounced for the spread on repriced debt 
as this looks at the proportion of the loan portfolio that has more interest rate risk exposure to 
the banks. From Column (2), we find that an increase in the banks’ capital buffers is associated 
with a reduction in the banks’ debt financing. The finding is robust with regards to the use of 
the capital ratio, though the effect is smaller (results are not reported and available on request). 
Our result is in line with Gambacorta and Shin (2016). 
However, one could argue that this is a simplified way to look at the cost of debt since 
the approach aggregates over repricing details of the debt portfolio. To understand this 
association further, we use the mid spread on the non-guaranteed Australian bonds (ܯܫܦ_ܴܵܲ), 
which were issued over the sample period. A bond yield at any point in time reflects the credit 
rating and time to maturity of that particular bond, which is may be a cleaner measure to assess 
the cost of debt financing. The results in Column (4) support our discussion above, whereby 
the coefficient on capital buffer is negative and statistically significant at the 10% level. Hence, 
banks are able to enjoy cheaper funding costs as the capital buffer increases. 
Regarding the cost of equity, we are unable to analyse the return on equity as most 
Australian banks are not publicly listed or have liquid share prices. However, a quick 
calculation reveals that total funding cost may actually decrease regardless of the cost of equity. 
Suppose a bank has a capital ratio of 10%, a cost of equity of 10% and a cost of debt of 5% and 
a total cost of funds of 5.5%. A 25bp decrease in the cost of debt for a one percent increase in 
capital implies that an additional 5% in capital results in a new cost of debt of 3.75% and a 
maximum total cost of funds of 4.69% (if the upper bound for the cost of equity remains the 
same). 
However, it might be that banks with higher capital ratios have difficulties in sourcing 
their funds and lending volumes are thus lower. Next, we turn to Panel B to examine the effect 
on bank lending. We examine two aspects of bank lending, including the price (Columns (1) 
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and (2)) and loan growth (Columns (3) to (5)). Our proxies for banks’ lending rate are the net 
interest margin on total loans (ܰܫܯ_ܶܮ), and the spread on loans (ܴܵܲ_ܶܮ)27. Interestingly, 
the coefficient on lagged capital buffer yields a positive effect on the lending margin proxies, 
net interest margin and spread on loans. The positive coefficients suggest that there is a positive 
association between banks' lending margins and capital buffer.  
Turning to Columns (3) to (5), we examine the impact of higher capital on the growth 
rates of total loans ( ܮܱܣܰ_ܩܴ ), commercial loans ( ܥܮܱܣܰ_ܩܴ ), and housing loans 
(ܪܮܱܣܰ_ܩܴ). Overall, the loan growth is negatively associated with the capital, though the 
effect is significant for commercial loans (significant at the 10% level). This is similar to the 
evidence for Brazilian banks whereby Cajueiro et al. (2011) obtain a negative relation between 
the capital buffer and loan growth. Given the increase in capital requirements, banks benefit 
from paying lower debt funding costs but provide lower lending volumes. As a result, the 
growth in business lending reduces.  
 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper, we analyse the dynamics of loan loss rates and the interactions of such 
dynamics on banks’ capital buffers and system resilience using a sample of Australian banks 
over 2002-2014. 
Our key findings are as follows. First, we confirm that the inclusion of economic 
downturns results in higher levels of systemic risk. At the 99.9% confidence level, the CVaR 
for the three-year horizon increases from $175.4 million to $6.5 billion. This indicates that the 
inclusion of an economic crisis period in the estimation of bank loan losses is crucial. The 
evidence further suggests that banks that have adopted the IRB approach using recent data do 
not fully account for the likelihood of financial crises in their internal models, and hence they 
are holding capital buffers that may be too low. The subsample tests for IRB and non-IRB 
banks also confirm this finding. 
Second, our study provides unique insights regarding the rate at which the loss 
measures dissipate in response to strengthening capital buffers. It is evident from the research 
design that higher capital buffers are associated with lower system-wide losses. Banks that hold 
capital buffers in excess of the regulatory requirement are able to absorb losses more 
																																																								
27 For robustness, we also use other proxies for banks’ earnings (for example, return on assets, net interest margin 
on loans and interest revenue on total loans) and the results are quantitatively similar.	
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sufficiently, and hence, are less likely to pass the losses onto the whole system. We find that 
the speed of decline reduces as the capital buffer increases. Given a confidence level of 99.9% 
and an additional capital buffer of 2% (or 5% for every bank including current capital buffers), 
the loss would be mitigated. 
Third, we shed new light on the debate regarding the trade-off between the benefits and 
costs of raising capital adequacy requirements. Our results show that a safer level of regulatory 
capital reduces the risk of bank failures and hence, lowers the cost of banks’ debt. However, 
this is achieved at the expense of reduced loan growth and higher lending rates. 
From a policy perspective, our findings are relevant to all economies that did not 
experience economic downturns after the start of loss data collections (e.g., South East Asian 
countries where data collection only commenced well after the South East Asian crisis in 1997 
and limited loss records are available). Bank regulators could apply our empirical approach to 
assess the adequacy of capital buffers and the likelihood and magnitude of losses exceeding 
such buffers to quantify the implied costs for society or to aid the design of more resilient 
financial systems. We reinforce the argument that higher capital requirements imply a higher 
level of resilience of the financial system.  
These results have to be interpreted with care as they are based on historical data. 
Further analysis is warranted to assess the impact of the violations of these assumptions and 
structural changes, which may take place. Despite these challenges we believe that we have set 
an adequate technical framework to explore the implications of higher capital requirements. 
Further work on financial system resilience should focus on (i) the reduction of systemic model 
risk via an improvement of forward-looking loan loss provisioning models, and (ii) optimising 
the trade-offs between the costs of financial services and higher capital standards that are 
necessary for reducing losses. We leave these investigations for future work in this area. 
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FIGURES 
 
Figure 1: Total assets and loss rates of the Australian banking system - APRA data (2002:Q1-
2014:Q4) and annual data (1978-2014). 
This figure shows the aggregate amount of total assets (in trillions) and the loss rate over time for 
Australian banks. Total assets are adjusted for inflation as of December 2014. Average quarterly loss 
rates are annualised and are expressed in percentage per annum. The shaded area represents the period 
when the markets experience an economic downturn, which is when the annual GDP growth rate was 
negative. The top chart is for the quarterly sample, and the data is from the Australian Prudential 
Regulation Authority (APRA). The second chart is for the annual sample, and the data is from banks’ 
public annual reports. The annual data includes consolidated accounts of Australian banks, which 
implies slightly higher total assets. 
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Figure 2: Empirical approach for modelling and simulating banks’ loss rates 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Model 1a:  
Average loss rates over τ years 
Model 1b:  
Average loss rates over τ years  
APRA data 
2002:Q1-2014:Q4 
Quarterly 
25 banks 
(+) detailed information 
(-) does not cover crisis period 
Annual reports 
1978-2014 
Yearly 
19 banks 
(-) not detailed information 
(+) does cover crisis period 
APRA data in 2014:Q4 (19 banks) 
- Obtain standard deviations of ߝ௧ାଵ→ఛ and ߝ௜,௧ାଵ→ఛ from Models 1a and 1b for 3-year 
period (i.e. ߬ ൌ3) 
- Compute banks’ capital buffers (CAP_BUFFERi,t) using information on regulatory 
capital (required) and capital held by banks (actual) from APRA data 
- Extrapolate the capital buffers and total assets of 19 banks from APRA sample to the 
annual sample.  
Simulation of ߝ௧ାଵ→ఛ and ߝ௜,௧ାଵ→ఛ from 
model 1a and loan losses over 3 
years, based on one million iterations 
Simulation of ߝ௧ାଵ→ఛ and ߝ௜,௧ାଵ→ఛ from 
model 1b and loan losses over 3 
years, based on one million iterations 
Stage 1: Estimation 
Stage 2: Simulation 
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Figure 3: Model predicted and actual loss rate Australian financial system using APRA data 
(2002:Q1-2014:Q4) 
Predicted loss rates are the fitted values that are obtained from model parameters. Actual loss rates are 
based on banks’ realised loss rates. The first chart is for the one-year forward loss rate, followed by the 
two-year and three-year forward loss rates. Note that the loss rate relates to the start of the reference 
period. 
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Figure 4: Model predicted and actual loss rate Australian financial system using annual data 
(1978-2014) 
Predicted loss rates are the fitted values that are obtained from model parameters. Actual loss rates are 
based on banks’ realised loss rates. The shaded area represents the period when the markets experienced 
an economic downturn, which was when the annual GDP growth rate was negative. The first chart is 
for the one-year forward loss rate, followed by the two-year and three-year forward loss rates. Note that 
the loss rate relates to the start of the reference period. 
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Figure 5: Sensitivity analysis of system resilience measures to hypothetical capital buffers for the 
Australian financial system – APRA (2002:Q1-2014:Q4) and annual sample (1978-2014)  
The figure illustrates the sensitivity of the system resilience measures to varying banks’ capital buffers. 
We replace the actual capital buffers of Australian ADIs as of 2014:Q4 with a set of hypothetical capital 
buffers (from 0.25%-5%). Note that the capital buffers are expressed in terms of RWA. The loss 
measures are based on the 99.9% Value-at-Risk. System resilience measures are reported in billions of 
Australian dollars in 2014. The top chart presents the sensitivity for the APRA sample and the second 
chart is for the annual sample.  
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Figure 6: Sensitivity analysis of system resilience measures to hypothetical add-on capital buffers 
for the Australian financial system – APRA (2002:Q1-2014:Q4) and annual sample (1978-2014)  
The figure illustrates the sensitivity of the system resilience measures to banks’ hypothetical add-on 
capital buffers in addition to their actual levels. We raise the actual capital buffers of Australian ADIs 
as of 2014:Q4 by a set of hypothetical add-on capital buffer cushions (from 0.25%-2%). We analyse 
the system loss, in which banks hold additional capital buffers on top of their existing levels. Note that 
the capital buffers are expressed in terms of RWA. The loss measures are based on the 99.9% Value-
at-Risk. System resilience measures are reported in $ millions and $ billions for the APRA data and 
annual data, respectively. These measures are in Australian dollars as in 2014. The top chart presents 
the sensitivity for the APRA sample and the second chart is for the annual sample.  
 
 
 
 
  
TABLES 
Table 1: Description of variables and data source 
Variables Definitions  Data source 
ܮܴ Average loss rate of bank i over one year, two years and three years APRA, (ARF_330_0_L), annual reports 
ܮܫܳ Banks’ liquidity ratio (defined as total liquid assets to total assets) APRA (ARF_320_0), annual reports 
ܮܱܣܰ_ܩܴ Two-year lag of loan growth (where current loan growth is calculated as the yearly 
moving difference between current loans and last year’s loans, scaled by last year’s total 
assets) 
APRA (ARF_320_0), annual reports 
ܪܮܱܣܰ	 Banks’ housing loan ratio (total housing loans to total loans) APRA (ARF_320_0), annual reports 
ܥܮܱܣܰ	 Banks’ commercial loan ratio (total commercial loans to total loans) APRA (ARF_320_0), annual reports 
ܦܧܲ Banks’ deposit funding (total deposits to total assets) APRA, ARF_320_0 
ܵܫܼܧ Bank size (natural logarithm of total assets, adjusted for inflation) APRA (ARF_320_0), annual reports 
ܥܣܲ Banks’ capital ratio (total equity to total assets) APRA, ARF_320_0 
ܴܱܲܨܫܶ Banks’ profitability (profit before tax and credit impairment charge to total assets) APRA, ARF_330_0_L 
ܶܫܧܴ_ܥܣܲ	 Banks’ observed capital ratio (sum of Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital to total assets) APRA (ARF_110_0_1), annual reports 
ܴܧܩ_ܥܣܲ	 Banks’ total regulatory capital ratio (total regulatory capital to total assets, where total 
regulatory capital is defined as 8 per cent of total risk-weighted assets) 
APRA (ARF_110_0_1), annual reports 
ܥܣܲ_ܤܷܨܨܧܴ Banks’ capital buffer in excess of the required capital (the difference between banks’ 
observed and regulatory capital ratios, i.e. excess capital to total assets) 
APRA (ARF_110_0_1), annual reports 
ܴܹܣ_ܦܴ	 Banks’ risk-weighted assets density ratio (total risk-weighted assets to total assets) APRA (ARF_320_0, ARF_110_0_1), 
annual reports 
ܩܦܲ_ܩܴ	
	
Current Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rate, seasonally adjusted and annualised ABS 
ܷܰܧܯܲ_ܩܴ Change in unemployment rate, seasonally adjusted and annualised ABS 
ܫܨܴܵ	 A binary variable that takes a value of one for periods 2004:Q4 and 2005:Q1 (2004 and 
2005) for APRA data (annual data) 
Authors’ computation 
ܴܵܲ_ܴܨ	 Spread on refinanced debt over 3-months (difference between the implied interest rate 
and cash rate, where the implied interest rate is calculated as the interest expense over 3-
month refinanced debt) 
APRA (ARF_330_0_L),  
 
	 	 	 	 	
	
39 
ܴܵܲ_ܴܶܨ	 Spread on total refinanced debt over all maturities (difference between the implied 
interest rate and cash rate, where the implied interest rate is calculated as the interest 
expense over total refinanced debt) 
APRA (ARF_330_0_L),  
 
ܴܵܲ_ܴܦ	 Spread on refinanced debt over 3-months (difference between the implied interest rate 
and cash rate, where the implied interest rate is calculated as the interest expense over 
total debt) 
APRA (ARF_330_0_L, ARF_320_0) 
ܯܫܦ_ܴܵܲ	 Mid spread on Australian bonds (excluding guaranteed bond issues)    Bloomberg 
ܶܶܯ	 Time to maturity of Australian bonds    Bloomberg 
ܴܣܶܫܰܩܵ	 A set of dummy variables that indicate the Moody’s credit ratings of banks’ bonds    Bloomberg 
ܥܮܱܣܰ_ܩܴ	 Annual growth rate of commercial loans APRA (ARF_320_0), annual reports 
ܪܮܱܣܰ_ܩܴ	 Annual growth rate of housing loans APRA (ARF_320_0), annual reports 
ܴܵܲ_ܶܮ	 Spread on total loans (total interest income over total loans minus the cash rate) APRA, (ARF_330_0_L) 
ܰܫܯ_ܶܮ	 Net interest margin on total loans (net interest income over total loans) APRA (ARF_330_0_L)
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Table 2: Description of variables 
This table presents the summary statistics of the variables used in the study in Panel A. Column I reports the statistics for the APRA data and Column II reports 
the statistics for the annual data. Panel B presents the Pearson correlation matrix for the variables that are included in the mixed model (1). Panel C reports the 
summary statistics for APRA and annual data as of 2014. All variables are winsorized at the 5th and 95th percentiles. **/*** denote significance at the 5% and 
1% level, respectively. 
Panel A: Summary statistics    
  I. APRA data for the period 2002Q1-2014Q4  II. Annual data for the period 1978-2014 
  (N=25 banks)   (N=19 banks) 
Variable  No. of obs Mean Std Dev P5 P95   No. of obs Mean Std Dev P5 P95 
One-year loss rate (%) LR 1,093 0.29 0.32 0.00 1.18   376 0.19 0.25 0.00 0.65 
Liquidity ratio (%) LIQ 1,093 19.30 11.16 2.88 46.23   365 13.86 7.65 3.26 32.94 
Housing loan ratio (%) HLOAN 1,091 58.68 31.80 0.00 100.00   376 60.26 22.38 21.03 99.63 
Lagged loan growth (%) LOAN_GR    867 11.45 15.39 -12.94 49.64   335 11.62 13.07 -7.67 46.38 
Deposit funding (%) DEP 1,093 62.54 15.97 28.44 85.39   370 67.34 14.64 43.67 90.73 
Size (in $billion) SIZE 1,093 23.49 2.20 20.06 26.97   376 23.96 2.31 19.94 27.24 
Capital ratio (%) CAP 1,093 9.94 5.63 4.62 23.77   376 6.61 2.02 4.23 12.44 
Profitability (%) PROFIT 1,093 1.55 0.94 0.31 4.12   370 1.36 0.44 0.58 2.15 
GDP growth rate (%) GDP_GR 1,093 2.95 0.97 1.30 4.80   376 3.19 1.45 0.90 5.30 
Unemployment growth rate (%) UNEMP_GR 1,093 -0.05 0.59 -0.60 1.40    375 -0.06 0.91 -1.00 2.20 
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Panel B: Pearson correlation matrix 
 LR LIQ HLOAN LOAN_GR DEP SIZE CAP PROFIT GDP_GR UNEMP_GR 
LR 1.00   
LIQ 0.25 1.00   
HLOAN -0.03 0.07 1.00   
LOAN_GR -0.10 0.07 0.19 1.00   
DEP -0.22 0.09 0.10 0.12 1.00  
SIZE 0.01 -0.24 0.38 -0.06 -0.14 1.00  
CAP 0.24 0.27 -0.30 -0.09 -0.32 -0.56 1.00  
PROFIT 0.24 -0.08 -0.12 -0.13 -0.53 0.04 0.42 1.00  
GDP_GR -0.17 -0.06 -0.03 0.02 0.07 -0.06 0.02 0.04 1.00  
UNEMP_GR 0.17 0.08 0.05 -0.12 -0.05 0.07 -0.01 -0.05 -0.53 1.00 
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Panel C: Summary statistics as of 2014 
  I. APRA data as of 2014Q4  II. Annual data for 2014  III. Difference 
  (N=19 banks)  (N=10 banks)  (I) - (II) 
Variable  No. of obs 
Mea
n Std Dev  No. of obs 
Mea
n Std Dev Mean 
One-year loss rate (%) LR 19 0.25 0.34  10 0.08 0.06  0.17** 
Liquidity ratio (%) LIQ 19 19.64 8.10  10 14.91 8.77        -11.25*** 
Housing loan ratio (%) HLOAN 19 64.13 30.87   10 68.82 19.05 -4.70 
Lagged loan growth (%) LOAN_GR 19 5.57 11.84  10 5.64 15.03 -0.06 
Deposit funding (%) DEP 19 65.71 14.76  10 68.72 11.07 -3.02 
Size (in $billion) SIZE 19 24.01 2.14  10 24.73 3.02 -0.72 
Capital ratio (%) CAP 19 9.49 3.96  10 7.28 1.36  2.20** 
Profitability (%) PROFIT 19 1.29 0.67  10 1.17 0.36  0.12 
GDP growth rate (%) GDP_GR 19 2.40 0.00  10 2.40 0.00  0.00 
Unemployment growth rate (%) UNEMP_GR 19 0.20 0.00   10 0.20 0.00  0.00 
Total Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital TIER_CAP 19 9.75 4.23   - - - - 
Regulatory capital REG_CAP 19 5.15 1.74   - - - - 
Capital buffer (%) CAP_BUFFER 19 4.61 3.29  - - - - 
RWA Density ratio RWA_DR 19 0.64 0.22  - - -   - 
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Table 3: Mixed model results for the bank-level loan portfolio loss rates using APRA data (2002:Q1-2014:Q4) and annual data (1978-2014) 
All variables (except size) are winsorized at the 5th and 95th percentiles. The table shows the parameters estimated from the mixed model (1) for the Australian 
financial system. The subscript ߬	refers to the one, two and three year horizon. */**/*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
ܮܴ௜,௧ାଵ,ఛ ൌ ߙ௜ ൅ ߚ ௜ܺ,௧ ൅ ߛߝ௧ାଵ,ఛ ൅ ߜߝ௜,ାଵ,ఛ 
 
  APRA data   Annual data 
Dependent variable One-year Two-year Three-year   One-year Two-year Three-year 
LIQ 0.0051*** 0.0055*** 0.0048***  -0.0032 -0.0038* -0.0040** 
 (0.0015) (0.0014) (0.0013)  (0.0022) (0.0020) (0.0018) 
HLOAN -0.0026 0.0028 0.0037**  -0.0049*** -0.0043*** -0.0036*** 
 (0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0019)  (0.0011) (0.0010) (0.0009) 
LOAN_GR 0.0013** 0.0010* 0.0007  0.0 0.0002 0.0003 
 (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0005)  (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0007) 
DEP -0.0052*** -0.0043*** -0.0046***  0.0021* 0.0023** 0.0021** 
 (0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0009)  (0.0012) (0.0010) (0.0012) 
SIZE -0.1818*** -0.1531*** -0.1080***  0.0481* 0.0573** 0.0601** 
 (0.0320) (0.0314) (0.0284)  (0.0247) (0.0242) (0.0240) 
PROFIT -0.0202 -0.0274* -0.0399***  -0.0087 -0.0098 -0.0171 
 (0.0154) (0.0140) (0.0124)  (0.0353) (0.0316) (0.0293) 
GDP_GR -0.0459** -0.0095 -0.0027  -0.0461** -0.0353* -0.0188 
 (0.0183) (0.0164) (0.0122)  (0.0194) (0.0206) (0.0221) 
IFRS -0.2120** -0.1985** -0.1947***  -0.1151 -0.1461 -0.1514 
 (0.1076) (0.0934) (0.0626)  (0.1336) (0.1429) (0.1547) 
γ 0.094 0.081 0.050  0.174 0.189 0.206 
δ 0.209 0.182 0.150  0.168 0.146 0.131 
Bank-specific intercept Y Y Y  Y Y Y 
No. of obs 767 669 573  313 295 278 
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Table 4: Simulated system resilience measures and confidence intervals  
The table shows a sensitivity analysis of the system resilience measures to varying confidence intervals. 
The resilience measures are computed for a range of confidence intervals (from 95% to 99.995%) and 
are based on one million iterations. This simulation uses actual capital buffers of Australian ADIs as of 
2014:Q4, and the three-year loss model. The highlighted baseline simulation assumes the 99.9% 
confidence level. The exceedance ratio is the number of loss exceedances over the number of iterations. 
VaR is the Value-at-Risk and CVaR is the conditional VaR (known as Expected Shortfall). The system 
resilience measures are reported in Australian dollars in 2014.  Panel A and Panel B report the system 
resilience measures for the APRA and annual samples, respectively.  
   
Panel A: Systemic risk measures using APRA data 
Confidence interval (%) Exceedance ratio Systemic VaR ($) Systemic CVaR ($)
95.000 0.0001                                 -                     3,508,598 
99.900 0.0001                                 -                 175,429,877 
99.925 0.0001                                 -                 233,906,503 
99.950 0.0001                                 -                 350,859,754 
99.975 0.0001                                 -                 701,719,508 
99.995 0.0001               1,276,791,819             2,059,435,102 
Panel B: Systemic risk measures using Annual data 
Confidence interval (%) Exceedance ratio Systemic VaR ($) Systemic CVaR ($)
95.000 0.0016                                 -                 446,747,296 
99.900 0.0016               4,620,834,645             6,539,793,576 
99.925 0.0016               5,148,179,608             7,087,042,573 
99.950 0.0016               5,888,996,887             7,880,463,959 
99.975 0.0016               7,207,894,214             9,268,513,665 
99.995 0.0016             10,650,966,361           12,784,423,214 
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Table 5: Sensitivity analysis of system resilience measures to minimum capital buffers 
The table shows the simulation results for both APRA data and annual data in the current and future implementation of capital buffers. In Column I, the 
simulation uses current implementation, whereby we apply the capital buffers of 2.5% and 3.5% of risk-weighted assets for non-DSIBs and D-SIBs as of 
2014:Q4, respectively. In Column II, we consider the future implementation of a countercyclical capital buffer of 2.5% on top of the existing capital conservation 
capital. Hence, we apply the capital buffers of 5% and 6% of risk-weighted assets for non-DSIBs and D-SIBs as of 2014:Q4, respectively. Note that the capital 
buffers are expressed in terms of RWA. The system resilience measures are based on the 99.9% confidence interval and one million iterations, using the three-
year loss rate model. CVaR is the conditional VaR (known as Expected Shortfall). The system resilience measures are reported in Australian dollars in 2014. 
 
Simulation results for the current and future implementation of capital requirements 
 I. Current implementation  II. Future implementation  
  Non D-SIBs (2.5%) & D-SIBs (3.5%)   Non D-SIBs (5%) & D-SIBs (6%)  
	 APRA Annual 	 APRA Annual 	
Exceedance ratio 0.0024 0.0217 	 0.0000 0.0004 	
Systemic VaR ($)      937,207,746        12,696,450,148  	                        -               99,381,452 	
Systemic CVaR ($) 1,852,380,192 17,050,504,418   301,994 1,289,382,853  
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Table 6: Summary of the simulation results 
The table shows the main simulation results for both APRA data and annual data. In Column I, the simulation uses actual capital buffers of Australian ADIs as 
of 2014:Q4. In Column II, we replace the actual capital buffers of Australian ADIs as of 2014:Q4 by a set of hypothetical capital buffers (from 0.25%-5%). In 
Column III, we raise the actual capital buffers of Australian ADIs as of 2014:Q4 by a set of hypothetical incremental capital cushion (from 0.25%-2%). Note 
that the capital buffers are expressed in terms of RWA. The system resilience measures are based on the 99.9% confidence interval and one million iterations, 
using the three-year loss rate model. CVaR is the conditional VaR (known as Expected Shortfall). The system resilience measures are reported in Australian 
dollars in 2014. 
 
 
Data/ Capital buffer Actual (baseline) Hypothetical (0.25% - 5%) Actual + hypothetical (0% - 2%) 
APRA (CVaR, 99.9%)  $175.4 million   $21.3 billion -  $15.9 million   $175.4 million - $0  
Annual (CVaR, 99.9%)  $6.5 billion   $59.1 billion - $4.8 billion  $6.5 billion - $345.5 million 
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Table 7: Robustness checks – IRB banks versus non-IRB banks 
The table shows the summary statistics and the resilience measures of two subsamples, internal-ratings based (IRB) and non-IRB banks. The RWA density ratio 
is expressed in decimal place and computed as the ratio of total risk-weighted asstes to total assets. The mean capital buffer is calculated as the difference 
between the observed capital (sum of Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital) and the regulatory capital (expressed in terms of total risk-weighted assets). The system resilience 
measures are computed for the 99.9% confidence interval and are based on one million iterations. This simulation uses actual capital buffers of Australian ADIs 
as of 2014:Q4. The exceedance ratio is the number of loss exceedances over the number of iterations. VaR is the Value-at-Risk and CVaR is the conditional 
VaR (known as Expected Shortfall). The mean RWA density ratio is count-weighted. Panel A reports the summary statistics for IRB banks and non-IRB banks. 
Panel B reports the system resilience measures for the APRA and annual samples. The system resilience measures are reported in Australian dollars in 2014. 
 
 
 
Panel A: Statistics for IRB and non-IRB banks (APRA data as of 2014:Q4) 
Sub-sample No. of obs Sum of total assets ($, billion) RWA density ratio (%) Mean capital buffer (%) 
IRB banks 5 2,578.69 0.65 4.64 
Non-IRB banks 14 300.09 0.65 7.92 
 
 
  
Panel B: Simulation results for IRB and non-IRB banks 
  I. Baseline model - APRA  II. Baseline model - Annual  III. Control for bank size 
	 IRB banks Non-IRB banks IRB banks Non-IRB banks Non-IRB banks (APRA) Non-IRB banks (Annual) 
Exceedance ratio 0.0001 0.0000 0.0030 0.0008 0.0000 0.0008 
Systemic VaR ($) - -      4,562,421,673              56,568,820                                    -                   820,876,482  
Systemic CVaR ($) 189,843,732 463,476  6,433,389,853 104,241,779  7,136,955 1,319,704,470 
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Table 8: Estimation results for banks’ funding costs and loan growth – APRA data from 
2008-2014. 
Table 8 reports the estimation results for the effect of capital on funding costs in Panel A, and 
lending activity in Panel B. The main explanatory variable is banks’ capital buffer. All 
explanatory variables are one-quarter lagged, except SIZE and GDP_GR. For Column (4), the 
additional controls are time to maturity (TTM) and the indicator variable for Moody’s credit 
ratings (RATINGS). The loan growth measures are annualised, and adjusted for inflation as of 
December 2014. We do not include the variable IFRS as this analysis spans from 2008 onwards. 
PROFIT is also excluded as it has a higher correlation with CAP_BUFFER. All variables 
(except size) are winsorized at the 5th and 95th percentiles. */**/*** indicate significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
 
  Panel A: Banks' funding costs   
Dependent variable (1) Spread on refinanced  debt over 3 months 
(2) Spread on total 
refinanced debt 
(3) Spread on 
total debt 
(4) Mid spread 
on bond 
L1_CAP_BUFFER -0.2519*** -0.1146*** -0.0573 -0.4947*** 
 (0.0447) (0.0285) (0.0383) (0.1810) 
L1_LIQ 0.1011** 0.0545* 0.0165 0.2793*** 
 (0.0504) (0.0309) (0.0353) (0.0679) 
L1_HLOAN 0.0288 0.0091 0.0124 -0.0050 
 (0.0191) (0.0132) (0.0106) (0.0232) 
L1_LOAN_GR -0.0054 -0.0038 -0.0064* -0.0173 
 (0.0056) (0.0038) (0.0038) (0.0118) 
L1_DEP -0.0348*** 0.0056 -0.0057 0.0078 
 (0.0122) (0.0072) (0.0058) (0.0221) 
SIZE -0.5245 0.0351 0.9851** -0.2406 
 (0.3908) (0.2593) (0.4795) (0.2694) 
GDP_GR -0.1110 -0.3202*** -0.5866*** 0.1605 
 (0.0822) (0.0521) (0.0648) (0.1446) 
TTM    0.0471** 
    (0.0207) 
RATINGS N N N Y 
Bank fixed effects Y Y Y N 
Adj R-squared 0.5862 0.4435 0.4736 0.4817 
No. of obs 509 514 589 150 
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Panel B: Lending activity  
 Dependent variable (1) Net interest margin on loans 
(2) Spread on 
loans 
(3) Total loan 
growth 
(4) Commercial   
loan growth 
(5) Housing loan 
growth 
L1_CAP_BUFFER 0.2379*** 0.3291*** -0.6686* -2.4527*** -1.3425*** 
 (0.0290) (0.070) (0.3961) (0.6482) (0.5179) 
L1_LIQ 0.0176 0.0938 0.2373 -0.1097 0.2257 
 (0.0218) (0.0609) (0.3726) (0.580) (0.5746) 
L1_HLOAN -0.0382*** -0.0809*** -0.1872 -1.0233*** 0.1238 
 (0.0084) (0.0216) (0.1450) (0.1966) (0.1659) 
L1_LOAN_GR -0.0057 -0.0392***    
 (0.0036) (0.0094)    
L1_DEP 0.0105** 0.0013 0.1616** 0.3172*** 0.0758 
 (0.0046) (0.0102) (0.0728) (0.1063) (0.1049) 
SIZE -0.850*** -0.9517** -8.0695** 17.4194*** -15.1833*** 
 (0.2104) (0.4677) (3.8031) (3.5373) (5.2957) 
GDP_GR 0.0281 -0.6909*** -2.7436*** -0.0982 -3.0329*** 
 (0.0329) (0.1019) (0.5705) (0.9734) (0.8309) 
Bank fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y 
Adj R-squared 0.858 0.8515 0.4276 0.3377 0.3139 
No. of obs 589 589 589 587 551 
	
